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ABSTRACT
Security protocol based on random key generation for an RFID system
by
Karthik Raghavan
Dr. Yoohwan Kim, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor o f Computer Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology, which describes the 
transmission of unique information by a wireless device, over Radio waves, when 
prompted or read by a compatible reader.
The basic components in implementing RFID are RFID tags which are small 
microchips attached to a radio antenna, mounted on a substrate, and a wireless 
transceiver/reader that queries the RFID tags.
This thesis deals with research issues related to security aspects in the 
communication between an RFID tag and its reader. More precisely, it deals with a new, 
simple and efficient security protocol based on an encryption that uses the concept of 
regular public key regeneration, which can be effortlessly adopted in an RFID 
application.
in
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C H A PTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an Automatic Identification method that 
works by storing and retrieving data remotely, using simple transponder devices [1]. A 
typical RFID system consists of a low-power transponder chip, called the RFID Tag that 
stores the identification data, a Radio Frequency Reader that can receive and transmit data 
using Radio Frequency waves, and a Backend application that stores all the data needed 
by the system which can validate the tag as being a legitimate one. RFID technology is 
finding wide-scale use these days, in various applications basically for the reason that it is 
easy to implement and is of relatively low cost.
An RFID tag is an object that can be attached to, or incorporated into a product, 
animal, or person for the purpose of identification using radio waves. Chip-based RFID 
tags contain silicon chips and antennas. Passive tags require no internal power source, 
whereas active tags require a power source [1], Apart from being classified based on their 
power source, RFID tags are also classified into different classes, based on then- 
functional characteristics. The RFID Class Structure classifies tags as belonging to one of 
five classes: Class I (Identity Tags), Class 2 (Higher Functionality Tags), Class 3 (Semi- 
Passive Tags), Class 4 (Active Ad Hoc Tags), or Class 5 (Reader Tags) [2], The 
following figure shows the inlay of a passive RFID tag:
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Figure 1 An RFID Tag that is being used in applications today. Inlay of Texas 
Instruments' I4m m X14m m  HF Tag [3]
An RFID reader is a device that is used to interrogate an RFID tag. The reader has 
an antenna that emits radio waves; the tag responds by sending back its data. A number 
of factors can affect the distance at which a tag can be read (the read range). The 
frequency used for identification, the antenna gain, the orientation and polarization of the 
reader antenna and the transponder antenna, as well as the placement of the tag on the 
object to be identified will all have an impact on the RFID system’s read range [4].
2. a 2. b 2. c
Figure 2.a High-Frequency Reader [5]; Figure 2.b Ultra-High Frequency EPC Reader [5]; 
Figure 2.c High-Frequency Handheld Reader [5]
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The backend application is a high-end computer or a server that manages the data 
required for the application that is using the RFID system. Typically, it could be a 
database interfaced with application-specific functions. It also defines the business logic 
for interpreting raw RFID data and the actions associated with it. For this reason, the 
backend application can never go down and it's connectivity with the readers should be 
maintained and standardized, always.
1.1 History of RFID
In 1946 Léon Theremin invented an espionage tool for the Soviet government 
which retransmitted incident radio waves with audio information. Even though this 
device was a passive covert listening device, not an identification tag, it has been 
attributed as the first known device and a predecessor to RFID technology. A more 
similar technology, the IFF transponder, was invented by the British in 1939, and was 
routinely used by the allies in W orld W ar II to identify airplanes as friend or foe [1]. In 
1950, RFID was experimented on with all the explorations that went on for more than a 
decade. The 1990s saw commercial RFID applications enter mainstream and standards 
being prescribed. Today, it’s being widely used and the RFID explosion still continues 
[6].
1.2 How it works
In a typical system, tags are attached to objects. Each tag has a certain amount of 
internal memory (EEPROM) in which it stores information about the object, such as its 
unique ED (serial) number. When these tags pass through a field generated by a reader.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
they transmit this information back to the reader, thereby identifying the object. The 
communication process between the reader and tag is managed and controlled by one of 
several protocols, such as the ISO 15693 and ISO 18000. Basically what happens is that 
when the reader is switched on, it starts emitting a signal at the selected frequency band. 
Any corresponding tag in the vicinity of the reader will detect the signal and use the 
energy from it to wake up and supply operating power to its internal circuits. Once the 
Tag has decoded the signal as valid, it replies to the reader, and indicates its presence by 
modulating (affecting) the reader field [5].
RF Antenna\RFID T ag
3
Host Computer
S c a n n e f
or Reader
Figure 3 RFID System [5]
If more than one valid tag is present then all those tags will respond at the same 
time, which causes a signal collision at the reader end and is seen as an indication of 
multiple tags. The reader manages this problem by using an anti-collision algorithm 
designed to allow tags to be sorted and individually selected. There are many different 
types of algorithms (Binary Tree, Aloha, etc.) which are defined as part of the protocol 
standards. Once the appropriate tag is selected, the reader is then allowed to perform 
various operations like read or a read/ write operation [5].
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The following table describes the various properties of an RFID system for different 
frequency ranges that it can operate in [5]:
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Figure 4 RFID system properties for different operating frequencies
1.3 Security Issues in RFID systems
Although RFID systems may emerge as the most pervasive computing 
technologies, there are still some security issues related to it that need to be addressed. As 
the applications of RFID keep growing in complexity and see wider use, the need for
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updated security measures that are rugged but still suit the simple working standards of 
RFID is also abounding.
One of the major issues related to RFID security is privacy. Tags reveal sensitive 
data when queried by readers and they do it indiscriminately [7]. Any perpetrator who 
wants to access classified data can do so, by querying the tag, the way it is supposed to 
be. The other most important security issue in using RFID is tracking. The tags usually 
allow a third party to easily establish an association between a given tag and its holder or 
owner, by revealing the location to any reader that queries it [7]. Apart from these issues, 
an RFID system is always vulnerable to attacks like Spoofing, Denial of Service, 
Eavesdropping, Counterfeiting and Physical attacks.
There has been extensive research carried out in the field of RFID security, since 
RFID technology’s invasion into every other field is beckoning, and a standardized 
security protocol for RFID systems is a possibility in the near future. This thesis aims at 
providing an efficient solution to the security issues of an RFID system, that have been 
addressed later on.
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CHAPTER 2
REID SECURITY LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since its invention in the 1940s, REID has been an obvious target for abuse. 
Wireless identification is a powerful capability, and RFID reveals both a physical 
object’s nature and location. Anyone can easily gain unauthorized access to RFID data 
because they don’t need a line of sight to gather it. For example, in the original RFID- 
based application— Identification Friend or Foe (IFE) systems—  security breaches 
resulted in Allied planes being shot down [8].
Despite concerns over security issues, because of its simplicity, low-cost and 
uniquely identifying capability, RFID systems are scaled with additional implementation 
to make it more suitable to use for a particular application and are achieving wide-scale 
deployment. There has always been a call for a consensus on a secure RFID 
communication protocol that would standardize all the security measures of a low-cost 
RFID system. However, with each passing day, the applications of RFID are 
tremendously growing only to put forth the question of the efficiency of existing security 
protocols when implemented in the new and more sophisticated applications. This 
stresses the need for constant extensive research to find an appropriate solution, to secure 
the RFID applications.
This chapter discusses the security issues in the predominant applications that use 
RFID, and also the research and concepts that try to resolve these issues. As mentioned.
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the earliest application of RFID was in W orld W ar II when it was used for the 
Identification Friend or Foe systems, which were compromised.
2.1 RFID Application Study
RFID has been quite extensively used in Inventory management. Livestock 
tracking. Automobile tracking. Airport Security, IDs and badges, etc.
The m ost common application of RFID in Inventory managements would be its 
replacement of barcodes to handle product and customer information and stocking and 
warehousing purposes. W al-mart was the first retailer to start using RFID in place of 
barcode, in 2006. But early efforts to use RFID technology for inventory management 
have raised concerns that tags will he used to develop consumer profiles. Civil-liberties 
advocates similarly fear that RFID technology may he used by the government to monitor 
people [9].
RFID is used in by a gamut of applications for tracking purposes. They are used 
in livestock farming where each animal has its own tag so that it can be tracked 
individually. [10] talks about how the US Department of Agriculture is planning to use 
RFID to uniquely identify every cow in the US, to step up efforts to track animal diseases 
more efficiently. It is used the same way in tracking cars in parking lots and in rental car 
lots. [ I I ,  12, 13, 14] explain how RFID tags can be used to not manage access control in 
parking lots, but also to track stolen cars and high end parts of a car, not to mention the 
possibility of adding a tag to the license plate to facilitate the police or anyone concerned, 
to retrieve any relevant data about the vehicle.
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The use of RFID tags can aid the detection and identification of possible threats in 
a diverse range of applications from passenger check-in at airports to the detection of 
intruders. [15] investigates an automatic tracking system to improve airport efficiency 
and security by means of a cellular network of passive RFID devices, which may be 
issued along within the boarding passes or as security badges.
2.2 RFID Security Issues
It is obvious that in the applications mentioned above and in the other applications 
of RFID, privacy and data integrity are highly essential, as they deal with sensitive and 
classified data that could be worth a fortune to an adversary. Hence, there have been 
several security measure and protocols that have been proposed over the years, to protect 
an RFID application from any of the possible attacks.
RFID security threats have been broadly classified into five categories and have 
been describes, as follows, in [8]:
2.2.1 Sniffing
RFID tags are indiscriminate—  they’re designed to be readable by any compliant 
reader. Unfortunately, this lets unauthorized readers scan tagged items unbeknownst to 
the bearer, often from  great distances. People can also collect RFID data by 
eavesdropping on the wireless RFID channel. Unrestricted access to tag data can have 
serious implications.
2.2.2 Tracking
RFID technology facilitates clandestine monitoring of individuals’ whereabouts 
and actions. RFID readers placed in strategic locations (such as doorways) can record
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
RFID tags’ unique responses, which can then be persistently associated with a person’s 
identity. RFID tags without unique identifiers can also facilitate tracking by forming 
constellations, recurring groups of tags that are associated with an individual. RFID 
technology also enables monitoring entire groups of people.
2.2.3 Spoofing
Attackers can mimic authentic RFID tags by writing appropriately formatted data 
on blank RFID tags. For example, thieves could retag items in a supermarket identifying 
them as similar, but cheaper, products. Tag cloning is another kind of spoofing attack, 
which produces unauthorized copies of legitimate RFID tags.
2.2.4 Replay attacks
Relay devices can intercept and retransmit RFID queries, which offenders can use 
to abuse various RFID applications. Fngland’s new RFID-enabled license plates, e- 
Plates, are one example of a modem RFID system that’s susceptible to attack by a relay 
device. The active e-Plate tags contain an encrypted ID code that is stored in the UK 
Ministry of Transport’s vehicle database. An attacker can record the encrypted identifier 
when another car’s license plate is scanned and replay it later.
2.2.5 Denial of service
RFID systems only work when RFID tags and back-end databases are available. 
Thieves can exploit this to steal RFID-tagged items by removing tags from the items 
completely or by putting them in a foil lined booster bag (Faraday cage) that blocks RFID 
readers’ query signals and temporarily deactivates the items. Another attack takes the 
opposite approach— flood an RFID system with more data than it can handle. Anti-RFID
10
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
activists could remove RFID tags and plant them on other items, causing RFID systems 
to record useless data, discrediting and devaluing RFID technology.
2.3 Existing Security Mechanisms and Protocols
Low cost Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags are highly resource limited, 
and cannot support strong cryptography. There has been constant research on finding a 
light-weight protocol that can handle these issues as efficiently as possible. The most 
common approaches involve a Challenge-Response System[16] with or without 
encryption/hash technique.
2.3.1 Challenge-Response System
[16] suggests a feasible security mechanism to enhance RFID tag’s security, but 
conforming to the low cost budget. It uses mutual authentication between reader and 
RFID tag that is based upon the principle of three-pass mutual authentication in 
accordance with ISO 9798-2, in which both entities in the communication verify the other 
participant’s knowledge of a secret cryptographic key. In the procedure of mutual 
authentication, all the RFID tags and readers that belong to the same application share the 
same secret cryptographic key Kab- When a RFID tag first enters the interrogation 
zone of a reader both parties will corroborate their identities to each other using three- 
pass mutual authentication. The illustration of the mutual authentication procedure 
between RFID tag and reader is shown in Figure I .
11
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^*'g£T _CHALLENGE(Rg)
(3)
Tokenj., = E ^ J R .  | |A.)
B (5 )
Reader RFID fag
Figure 5 Illustration of mutual three-pass authentication procedure between RFID tag and
reader
Another research paper [17], suggests a similar type of Challenge-Response 
System, in which the reader chooses a challenge, x, which is a random number and 
transmits it to the tag. The tag computes x = ek( y) and transmits the value y to the reader 
(here e is the encryption rule that is publicly known and K is a secret key known only to 
the reader and the particular tag). The reader then computes y ' = e k(x ). Then the reader 
verifies that y' = y.
2.3.2 Encryption
Encrypting the data that is transmitted is a simple idea of ensuring data privacy 
and providing data integrity. But incorporating even a simple encryption algorithm in an 
RFID system requires a hardware implementation that’s resource intrinsic. TEA is an 
encryption algorithm designed for simplicity and ease o f implementation and is 
recommended for RFID applications by [17]. The encryption algorithm is based on the 
Feistel cipher [18] and a large number of iterations to gain security without
12
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compromising simplicity. A description of the algorithm is provided in [19]. A hardware 
implementation of the algorithm is stated to have the same complexity as DES [19].
Implementing any of the available complex encryption algorithms is going to be 
an overhead on the system. Typically, a tag can only store hundreds of bits, roughly have 
between 5000 and 10000 logic gates, and a maximum communication range of a few 
meters. W ithin this gate counting, only between 250 and 3000 gates can be devoted to 
security functions. It is interesting to recall that for a standard implementation of the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or any other relatively complex encryption 
algorithm, between 20000 and 30000 gates are needed, not to mention the power 
restrictions [7].
2.3.3 Hash Function
Hash functions have been proposed as a replacement to encryption. One of the 
simple proposals described a Hash Lock mechanism [20]. According to the Hash Lock 
mechanism, the tag is locked during the manufacturing process and it is given a value (or 
meta-ID) y, and it is only unlocked from the individual by presentation of a key or PIN 
value X such that y = h(x) for a standard one-way hash function h. [21] explains 
Randomized hash-lock and Hash Chain mechanisms which are also common. Other 
complex hash functions like SHA-I have also been considered, but as mentioned they 
demand a tight high-end hardware configuration.
2.3.4 Simple Approaches
Another research paper by Zongwei Luo, Terry Chan and Jenny S. Li [18] 
discusses different simpler approaches to a Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol. 
The proposed approaches in [20] are briefed below;
13
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Extra Device Added Approach -  An additional device operated along with the tags and 
readers, to prevent attacks using Faraday Cage, Blocker Tag or Active Jamming.
Radio Frequency M odification Approach -  Readers and special tags can employ random 
frequencies for transmission so that unauthorized users may not access the data. This also 
helps in preventing collision when multiple tags are being used.
Other Approach -  These include methods like killing the tag, which makes the tag truly 
dead, and can never be reactivated, to prevent tracking and by using a Hash Lock.
A lot of security protocols that use variations of the above mentioned security 
mechanisms, have been proposed but with RFID growing tremendously in application, 
these protocols don’t prove to be completely fool-proof or resource-friendly.
14
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CHAPTER 3
SECURITY PROTOCOL DEFINITION AND IM PLEM ENTATION 
The working of a security protocol has to be precisely defined, in order to analyze 
its performance, especially when it is used with a relatively less complex and a low-cost 
application, like an RFID system. This Chapter describes how the proposed security 
protocol is defined and implemented, and details its working. This is a proposed 
theoretical solution to the security issues involved in an RFID system, the efficiency of 
which was evaluated and is elucidated on, in the next Chapter.
The proposed Security protocol guarantees data privacy and authentication 
between the Tag and the reader, to the maximum extent possible. It uses simple 
information exchange between the Tag and the Reader, to authenticate each other. The 
existing security protocols use simple encryption or an efficient hashing technique to 
authenticate the Tag and the Reader. Though the proposed protocol also uses encryption, 
it makes the RFID system foolproof in almost every way that the other protocols miss out 
on. This does increase the cost and load on the tags, but will prove to be highly secure for 
a system that needs it.
15
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3.1 W hy does RFID Communication need Security?
W ith a technology as ubiquitous as radio-frequency identification, the 
applications using it just keep growing by the day. Some of the current applications that 
use the RFID technology are:
• Inventory Control and Management 
Container/ Pallet/ Shipment Tracking 
ID Badges and Access Control 
Automatic Toll Control 
Airport Security
Equipment/ Personnel tracking in Hospitals 
Parking Lots/ Rental Car Lots 
The data exchanged in these applications, and the various others, that use RFID, 
are quite sensitive and need to be protected, in order to avoid identity theft, data loss, 
data/ product duplication, etc. Compromised RFID systems can be used to the will of the 
hacker, to reproduce/ modify/ misuse the system. The Interceptor can reproduce tags, by 
monitoring the Tag ID exchange and can, with calculated attacks, fool the reader and the 
database, in giving any information he needs. A compromised RFID system can hence, 
cause a huge monetary, commercial or personal loss. W ith a lot of military applications 
using RFID these days, security of RFID data exchange between the Tag and the reader, 
is of utmost importance. Security breaches can happen at the RFID tag, network, or data 
level. Part of the problem with adopting existing standards, at least at one level, may be 
the extreme low cost and extremely light functionality on the tags. All of the good 
security tools developed over the last 20 years won't fit into the hardware that's available
16
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on most of these RFID tags. Even encryption chews up most of the processing power of 
the Tag. Therefore, a security protocol that uses minimal resources and yet is efficient in 
authenticating the Tag and the Reader, for each other, is absolutely necessary.
3.2 Custom RFID System Description
3.2.1 RFID Reader
The Reader required for the proposed protocol, needs to be highly flexible. The 
protocol requires a reader that can read, as well as write, to the tag. The frequency, which 
the reader has to read from, is decided based on the application. A high-frequency reader 
that can read and write is appropriate in testing the proposed security protocol. The reader 
needs to support Frequency Hopping -  Code Division M ultiple Access (FH -  CDMA) 
and should have circuitry for modulation and demodulation, at low, high, ultra-high or 
microwave frequencies, whichever is prescribed for the application. The reader should 
also be capable of transmitting to more than one channel. This is an overhead on the 
power consumed, but the system can still be optimized by using an appropriate m ulti­
channel RF transmitter chip to get the desired results.
Texas Instruments Inc.’s product. Multi-standard High frequency RFID 
Reader/W riter IC, TRF7960 is a suggested reader, for any application that uses the 
security protocol based on random key generation. The specifications of TRF7960 
include Completely Integrated Protocol handling (OSI Model Layer 3 and below). 
Separate internal high-PSRR power supplies. Dual receiver input with AM and PM 
demodulation, Reader-to-reader anti-collision, wide operating voltage range 2.7V to 5.5V 
and Ultra-low power m odes[22]. The TRF7690, however, is not a multi-channel RF
17
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transmitter, but this can be fixed by using such a transmitter chip, like Texas Instruments 
Inc.’s H ighly Integrated Multi-channel RF Transmitter for Low-power wireless 
applications, CC1150[23]. The TRF7690 describes the design of a basic RFID reader that 
would suit the proposed protocol. The internal circuitry of TRF7690 is shown below [24]:
Antenna and 
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Figure 6 Basic RFID reader (TRF7690) Internal Hardware Design 
3.2.2 RFID Tag
The RFID Tag required for the security protocol based on random key generation, 
is customized to suit the protocol and is not available in the market. Hence, this protocol 
may not work with any of the current RFID tags that are available. However, the only 
customization would involve the Read-only registers and the Re-writable memory. The 
basic configuration and the chip configuration could resemble Texas Instruments Inc.’s
18
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Single-Chip, Low-power, Low-cost CMOS FSK/GFSK/ASK/OOK RF Transmitter for 
Narrowband and multi-band Apps, CC1070 [25], which are being marketed for RFID 
tags.
The RFID Tag needs to support multi-channel transmission and frequency 
modulation. The proposed measure of sophistication can never be imposed on a passive 
tag that does not have a power source of its own. Hence, this protocol can only be used 
with active tags and high-end applications that would justify the cost of using these tags, 
which eventually will prove to be cheaper than any other technology used in its place. 
The internal circuit diagram of the basic RFID Tag, CC1070, that can be modified, so as 
to be used with this protocol, is shown below [26]:
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Figure 7 Basic RFID Tag internal Circuit diagram
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The proposed protocol requires the Tag to have three basic registers that hold the 
data used to identify the tag uniquely, apart from the other registers that are needed for 
intermediate computation, like while encrypting and decrypting data. It is imperative to 
describe these memory units because they define the working of the proposed security 
protocol in a big way.
3.2.3 RFID Tag M emory Description
The RFID Tag has a 128-bit ROM  that stores the 128 bit Tag ID. Since the Tag 
ID associated with a particular Tag cannot be changed, it is written to a Read-Only 
Memory even when it is manufactured. This value, which uniquely identifies the tag, can 
only be read and can never be modified.
The tag also has two 64 Bit Re-writable memories, which are used to store 
important data that can be read and modified. One of the 64 Bit Re-writable memories 
(RAM) stores the 64 Bit Encryption Key, which is a public key shared between the tag 
and the reader, that is, the backend application, and can be over-written. The other 64 Bit 
Re-writable memory is used to store a 64 Bit Authentication Code, which is used to 
authenticate the reader and can be over-written. The following is a schematic 
representation of the memory structures, needed in the RFID tag, for the proposed 
security protocol:
20
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RFID Tag’s MainMeitiory S tructure fiir Security protocol based o« 
Random K e y  Generation
128 Bit Tag ID (ROM)
64 MSB 64 LSB
64 B it Encryption Key (RAM)
Public Key
64 B it Authenticaition Code (RAM)
Meta ID
Figure 8 Memory Structure Description of the required RFID tag
3.2.4 RFID System’s Backend Application
The Backend Application holds the data about all the legitimate RFID tags that 
are a part of the RFID application. The Backend application could be any application, 
running on a (remote) server. Database M anagement System or just a Data dump. The 
backend application needs to be connected to the reader at all times and the connectivity 
and integrity o f this link, plays a crucial role in the performance of the RFID application. 
As mentioned, the backend application holds the data about the valid tags that are a part 
of the application. In a system, with the proposed security protocol being implemented, 
the backend application stores information which includes the 128-bit Tag ID, 64-bit 
Encryption Key and 64-bit Authentication Code of every legitimate RFID tag. The value 
for the tag ID cannot be modified but, the values of the Encryption key and the 
Authentication Code, associated with a particular Tag ID can be modified. The backend 
application also takes care of any data processing, like encryption/ decryption, generating
21
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a new random encryption key, generating a new random authentication code, etc., thus 
abstracting the reader from any manipulation with the data.
The reader can communicate with the backend application, using any of the basic 
network protocols like TCP/IP, SSL, SOAP, etc. or could use a middleware that manages 
the communication in a secure way. An RFID Middleware is software that manages the 
flow of data between tag readers and backend enterprise applications and is responsible 
for the quality, and therefore usability, of the information [27]. A high level of security 
can be incorporated in the middleware that has the capability o f routing data to more than 
one standardized server. The backend application should be able to provide valid data, in 
the appropriate form, to the reader, at anytime when it is requested for.
3.3 RFID Security Implementation based on Protocol
The EPC and ISO have standardized the first two layers of the communication 
protocol stack between the readers and the tags. These two layers include the local 
wireless communication that occurs between a reader and the tags within its read field. 
The first layer standard is the physical, which describes the specific radio frequencies and 
whether tags and readers are communicating in half or full duplex mode. The second 
layer, referred to as the data link layer, has been standardized based on a slotted Aloha 
scheme [28].
The physical (PHY) layer standard functionality defines how the reader 
communicates with the tag and how the tag communicates with the reader using passive 
communication. The physical layer features include the signaling, modulation and 
encoding of symbols. The physical layer must be amenable to long range passive
22
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communications. The data link (DATA) layer forms the base logic layer of the class 
structure, which provides a framework to classify RFID tags according to their primary 
functional characteristics. The data link layer standard defines how communications are 
logically grouped, or packetized, the commands that the reader may issue to the tag, the 
tag’s response to any commands, when and how a tag may initiate communication or 
functionality without being commanded by the reader, and the resource discovery, i.e., 
tag identification, algorithm [2].
The proposed Security protocol makes sure that its implementation secures RFID 
communication, in both the layers of the RFID communication protocol suite. The 
Physical Layer, which deals with the actual wireless data communication, uses Frequency 
Hopping and the Data Link Layer uses Data Encryption, according to the proposed 
protocol. The following figure describes the security implementation in the two layers of 
the RFID communication protocols suite:
M U D  C’ o i m n i i i u c a t i o n  P r o t o c o l  S u i t e  w i t l i  S e c x u i t y  D u p l e i u e i i t m t i o u
Ditto. Link Layer (DA TA}
D a t a  E u c i y p t i o i i
Physiccil Le^er (PHY)
F r e q u e n c y  H o p p i n g  -  C D A I A
Figure 9 Security in the different layers of RFID communication protocol suite
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3.3.1 Security Implementation in Physical Layer
The frequency range, in which the RFID application operates, is divided into 
bands or frequency channels. This type of communication between a tag and the reader, 
using Frequency Modulation, is pretty common [28] and is usually used when there are 
multiple tags, to avoid collision while reading [20]. The RFID reader and the tag use one 
particular channel to transmit or receive the legitimate data and send dummy data through 
the other channels. The dummy data could be anything that is in the same format of the 
original data but does not affect the RFID system’s working in any way. The frequency, 
at which valid data is transmitted, keeps changing for every transmission, by both the tag 
and the reader. This frequency switching is called Frequency Hopping and this type of 
access method is called Frequency Hopping -  Code Division M ultiple Access [29]. [30, 
31] define how Frequency Hopping is already being used in RFID systems. It is for this 
reason that the tag and the reader are chosen such that they are able to transmit to 
multiple channels.
The sequence of frequency hops is known both to the reader (Backend 
application) and the tag, so that legitimate data can be read from the appropriate 
frequency. This concept is similar to what is used by Bluetooth Technology [32], except 
for the fact that Bluetooth uses Frequency Hopping to ensure proper communication, as it 
permits connectivity to multiple Bluetooth enabled devices, and the proposed RFID 
system uses Frequency Hopping to make Eavesdropping or any other attack on the 
Physical layer, as non-feasible as possible.
Frequency Hopping can be used with Low-frequencies, High-frequencies, Ultra- 
high Frequencies and M icrowave frequencies. Therefore the RFID application can
24
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choose to work in any frequency range, based on its requirements, and yet have the 
proposed security implementation in its Physical Layer.
3.3.2 Security Implementation in Data Link Layer
The Data Link Layer decides in what format and how exactly data is exchanged 
between the tag and the reader. Security implementation in this layer is imperative and 
the proposed protocol, like a lot of existing security protocols for RFID systems, uses 
data encryption. Data encryption guarantees a high level of data integrity and makes the 
data comprehendible only by the RFID application using it.
Since encrypting and decrypting of data, places a lot of complications on the 
system, like power consumption, memory resources, processing time, etc., the proposed 
protocol cannot be implemented in a RFID system that uses passive tags, tags that don’t 
have a power source of their own. Hence, this protocol can be used only with a more 
complex system that can support its implementation. The type of encryption is chosen 
after careful consideration of a lot of factors that decide the performance measures of the 
RFID system.
A relatively less sophisticated system or a system that has its physical layer 
completely secure from any sort of interception, can afford a simple encryption algorithm 
and if the application requires a high level of data privacy and integrity, a rugged 
encryption algorithm could be used. The type of encryption is always a trade-off and 
should be chosen prudently, so as to make the system as efficient as possible, without 
impacting the performance of the RFID system.
The security protocol based on Random key generation, as proposed in this thesis, 
was tested with three different Encryption methods, namely. Boolean encryption. Tiny
25
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Encryption Algorithm and Advanced Encryption Standards. These three encryption 
algorithms were chosen because they differ in the complexity of implementation, their 
efficiency and immunity to attacks, the Boolean encryption being the simplest algorithm 
and the AES being the most efficient of the three. These three encryption methods are 
described in detail as follows:
3.3.2.1 Boolean Encryption
Boolean encryption, as used in this implementation of the security protocol based 
on Random key generation, is a simple Binary XOR operation. The encryption is a 
simple process of computing the value of the binary value of plaintext that needs to be 
encrypted, XORed with the binary value of a public key. [21, 33, 34] proposes a security 
model that introduces a challenge-response mechanism which uses no cryptographic 
primitices other than simple XORs. The binary XOR operation (also known as the binary 
XOR function) will always produce a 1 output if  either of its inputs is 1 and will produce 
a 0 output if both of its inputs are 0 or 1. To decrypt the encrypted value, using Binary 
XOR operation, the binary value of the encrypted value is XORed with the binary value 
of the same shared public key that was used in encrypting the plaintext. This type of 
encryption requires no more power than a system that uses no encryption, but can be 
easily cracked. This serves to just abstract the actual data instead of making it completely 
secure.
3.3.2.2 Tiny Encryption Algorithm
The Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) is a block cipher notable for its simplicity 
of description and implementation (typically a few lines of code). It was designed by 
David W heeler and Roger Needham of the Cambridge Computer Laboratory, and first
26
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presented at the Fast Software Encryption workshop in 1994 (Wheeler and Needham, 
1994).
TEA operates on 64-bit blocks and uses- a 128-bit key. It has a Feistel structure 
with a suggested 64 rounds, typically implemented in pairs termed cycles. It has an 
extremely simple key schedule, mixing all of the key material in exactly the same way for 
each cycle [35].
Routine, written in the C language, for encoding with key k[0] - k[3]. Data in v[0] 
and v[I]: [19]
void code(long* v, long* k) { 
unsigned long y=v[0],z=v[I], sum=0, /* set up */ 
delta=0x9e3779b9, /* a key schedule constant */ 
n=32 ;
while (n—>0) { /* basic cycle start */ 
sum += delta ;
y 4-= ((z«4)4-k[0]) ^ (z+sum) ^ ((z»5 )4 -k [I]) ; 
z += ((y « 4 )+ k [2 ]) ^ (y4-sum) ^ ((y » 5 )+ k [3 ]) ;
} /* end cycle */ 
v[0]=y ; v[I]=z ; }
The following diagram describes how TEA works [33]:
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Figure 10 TEA encryption flowchart
This type of algorithm can replace DES in software, and is short enough to write 
into almost any program on any computer and on one implementation it is three times as 
fast as a good software implementation of DES which has 16 rounds [19]. The only 
attack that is possible is a Brute-force attack. The Tiny Encryption Algorithm was chosen 
because it is as good as DES, but is a lot faster and very easily implemented in a system 
that’s as simple as an RFID system. TEA has a few weaknesses. M ost notably, it suffers 
from equivalent keys - each key is equivalent to three others, and this means that the 
effective key size is only 126 bits. TEA is also susceptible to a related-key attack which 
requires i P  chosen plaintexts under a related-key pair, with 2^^ time complexity [35].
3.3.2.3 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), also known as Rijndael, is a block 
cipher adopted as an encryption standard by the U.S. government. The AES is the 
successor of DES [36]. The cipher was developed by two Belgian cryptographers, Joan 
Daemen and Vincent Rijmen.
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AES has a fixed block size of 128 bits and a key size of 128, 192 or 256 bits. 
Most of AES calculations are done in a special finite field. AES operates on a 4x4 array 
of bytes, term ed the state (versions of Rijndael with a larger block size have additional 
columns in the state) [37]. For encryption, each round of AES (except the last round) 
consists of four stages:
1. AddRoundKey —  each byte of the state is combined with the round key; each 
round key is derived from the cipher key using a key schedule.
2. SubBytes —  a non-linear substitution step where each byte is replaced with 
another according to a lookup table.
3. ShiftRows —  a transposition step where each row of the state is shifted cyclically 
a certain num ber of steps.
4. M ixColumns —  a mixing operation which operates on the columns of the state, 
combining the four bytes in each column using a linear transformation.
The final round replaces the M ixColumns stage with another instance of AddRoundKey 
[37].
The following is a diagramatic representation of the different stages in AES 
encryption [37]:
In th e  ftddEoiindK ey step , each  b:yte o t th e  sta te  is com bined  ,l';j 
inith a byte of th e  round subkey using th e  XOR operation  ).
Figure 11 The AddRoundKey stage of AES
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AES is so secure that since June 2003, it is being used by the US Government for 
encrypting classified data [37]. An attack against 128-bit key AES requiring 'only' 2^^° 
operations would be considered a break even though it would be, now, quite unfeasible. 
However, implementing AES in an RFID system might be an expensive proposal and is 
recommended only where a high level of security is required.
3.3.3 RFID System Data Packet Format
The Data packet for the proposed RFID system looks similar to standard packet 
format, of any other normal RFID system. The standard data packet, as specified in Texas 
Instruments Inc.’s documentation of TI S6390 [38], which is used as an RF transponder, 
is described below:
RFID Data Packet Format according to TI 8 (390
S ta rt L e n g th Node C om m and C om m and D ata B lock
o f o f A ddress Flags CKeck
F ram e P ack e t C K aracter
1 B yte I  B ytes 2 B ytes IB y t^ 1 Byte 0 - 23 Bytes 2 B ytes
Figure 15 RFID Data Packet Format according to TI S6360
The proposed security protocol makes use of the command field to hold the 
Operation Bits. These Operation Bits define the type of operation being performed with 
the data packet. The following table shows the operation corresponding to the Operation 
Bits:
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Operation Bits Operation
00 Clear contents of RAM of Tag
01 Read Request by Reader
1Û Response by Tag
11 Write contents to RAM of Tag
Table 1 Operation Bits and the corresponding operations
The operating bits are set to 01 whenever the RFID reader is transmitting data or 
requesting data to the tag. The operating bits are set to 10 whenever the tag is 
transmitting data or is sending a response to an RFID reader. W hen the operating bits are 
set to 11, the Reader is sending data to overwrite the data in the RAM  of the tag, the 64- 
bit Key, in particular. W hen the operating bits are set to 00, the reader is basically 
sending a command to the tag, to erase the content of its RAM.
3.4 Protocol Implementation
The protocol implementation defines how the Tag and the Reader authenticate 
each other, thus making the RFID communication safe and authentic. The proposed 
protocol, which is based on random Key generation uses exchange of data between the 
tag and the reader to make sure the communication is legitimate. The system is setup with 
the devices mentioned above to facilitate communication according to the proposed 
protocol.
The step-wise communication between the tag and the reader is described below:
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1. 64-Bit Random Number Generation
The Backend Application generates a 64-bit random number, based on any of the 
distribution functions, and sends this random number to the reader, using any of the 
protocols adopted by the RFID system. It should be noted that the type of backend 
application and the communication link between the reader and the backend application 
do not affect the measure of the security for the communication between the tag and the 
reader, as according to the proposed protocol. But choosing the backend application with 
a secure middleware that is appropriate for the system that has the proposed protocol 
implemented is recommended. The reader that received the 64-bit random number from 
the backend application sends it to the tag, with the operation bits set to 01, in the format 
specified for the protocol.
2. 64-Bit Authentication Code Encryption
The tag receives the 64-bit random num ber and uses it as a key to encrypt its 64- 
bit Authentication Code. The type of encryption could be anything that suits the 
performance and scalability of the system. The protocol was tested with all three types of 
encryptions mentioned above. Once the Authentication Code is encrypted with the 64-bit 
random number, as the key, the tag then sends the encrypted Authentication Code back to 
the reader, with the operation bits set to 10. The reader, in turn sends it to the backend 
application, after validating the node address, which basically tells the reader which tag it 
received the data from, when it is communicating with more than one tags. If the reader 
does not receive a response within a specified time interval, the operation is timed out. 
The proposed protocol was tested with a timeout of 250 nanoseconds.
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3. Encrypted Authentication Code Decryption
When the Backend Application receives the encrypted Authentication, it decrypts 
it, using the random number it generated, as the public key. The backend application then 
uses the decrypted Authentication Code to look up its database and tries to retrieve the 
corresponding 64-bit Key and 128-bit Tag ID values. If the values are not found, the 
communication is terminated, since a wrong value of the Authentication Code de- 
authenticates the Tag, implicitly. Otherwise, the corresponding 64-bit Key and Tag ID 
values are retrieved from the database.
4. Tag ID Encryption by Backend Application
Once the backend application retrieves the data, corresponding to the 
Authentication Code, it encrypts the 128- bit Tag ID, using the same encryption that was 
used before. The 128-bit Tag ID is encrypted in two 64-bit blocks. The 64 Least 
Significant Bits are encrypted using the 64-bit Authentication Code of the Tag, as the key 
and the 64 M ost Significant Bits are encrypted using the 64-bit Key of the Tag, as the 
key. The backend application then sends the encrypted Tag ID to the reader which in turn 
sends it to the appropriate tag, after setting the operation bits to 01.
5. Tag ID Decryption by Tag
W hen the Tag receives the encrypted Tag ID, it decrypts it with its 64-bit 
Authentication Code and 64-bit Key. The Tag decrypts the encrypted 64-bit block 
corresponding to the 64 Least Significant Bits of the Tag ID, using the Authentication 
Code as the key and the other encrypted 64-bit block, corresponding to the 64 Most 
Significant Bits of the Tag ID, with the 64-bit Key of the Tag. The tag then puts the 
decrypted 128-bit tag ID together and compares it with its own tag ID, in the ROM. If the
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tag IDs match, then the tag has authenticated the reader. If the tag IDs do not match, then 
the tag drops the communication with that particular reader. The tag checks for an 
operation timeout again, as described before.
6. Tag ED Encryption by Tag
If the Reader had been authenticated, it needs to authenticate the tag too. The tag, 
after matching the tag IDs and authenticating the reader, encrypts the tag ID again, in the 
similar way, encrypting it as two 64-bit blocks. But this time, the tag encrypts the 64 
Least Significant Bits of the Tag ID with its 64-bit Key and the 64 M ost Significant Bits 
of the Tag ED with the 64-bit Authentication Code. The tag then sends the new encrypted 
tag ID to the reader, setting the operation bits to 10.
7. Tag ID Decryption by Reader
The reader receives the encrypted Tag ED from the tag, to decrypt, with the 64-bit 
Authentication Code and the 64-bit Key of the tag. If the reader did not receive the 
encrypted tag ID over a specified period of time (250 nanoseconds) the operation times 
out. When the reader receives the encrypted tag ID, it verifies the tag that sent it, and 
passes on the encrypted tag ID to the backend application. The backend application 
decrypts the block corresponding the 64 Least Significant Bits of the tag ID with the 64- 
bit Key and the block corresponding to the 64 M ost Significant Bits of the tag ID with the 
64-bit Authentication Code. If the decrypted tag ED matches the one that was retrieved 
from the database, the tag is a valid one. The tag is, thus, authenticated. If the tag IDs do 
not match, then the operation fails and the reader breaks its communication with the 
corresponding tag.
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8. Random Key Generation
Once the tag and the reader are authenticated, the backend application makes the 
system more secure by changing the public keys that were used for encryption. In doing 
this, the backend application generated two 64-bit random numbers, one for the 
authentication code and one for the tag’s key. The backend application then updates the 
value of these two for that particular tag ID, in the database and sends these two 64-bit 
data to the reader which in turn sends it to the tag, after setting the operation bits to 11. 
The tag waits for the data from the reader and if it does not receive it within the specified 
time, then it closes the communication. Since the reader and the tag have already been 
authenticated, the communication is ideally complete. W hen the tag receives the 
randomly generated 64-bit Authentic Code and the 64-bit Key, it rewrites its 
Authentication Code and Key, with the new values and sends an acknowledgement signal 
back to the reader, which could be the same randomly generated data that the reader sent 
it.
The final part of the protocol, where random keys are generated for the next round 
of communication, keeps the system highly secure because even if the keys were 
compromised, an attacker can never use it to fake the reader or the tag because the keys 
are periodically changed and are known just to the reader and the tag.
This protocol is similar to the Challenge-response mechanism described in [16, 
17] but is more robust. The protocol mentioned in [16, 17] authenticates just the tag and 
does not let the tag authenticate the reader and is vulnerable to various attacks.
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CHAPTER 4
RFID SECURITY PROTOCOL SIMULATOR 
In order to observe and analyze the performance measures of the proposed 
security protocol and to model its functional parameters, a software program was coded, 
as a part of the research. It is an effort to aid the analysis of various RFID system 
configurations under the demands of specific RFID applications, that implement the 
security mechanism describes in this thesis. Although the simulator was running on a 
high-end com puter system with 3.06GHz Pentium processor with 1GB RAM, it was 
coded to consider the factors of a real-time RFID system that operates based on specified 
RFID and air-interface standards, which are described by ISO/EEC 14443A/B, ISO/EEC 
15693, ISO 18000, EN 300 400 Class 2 (Europe) and FCC CFR47 Part 15 (US).
This chapter describes the functions available in the simulator and flexibility it 
provides in testing the proposed protocol. The simulator software was built on Java 
platform with a front end in Java Swing. The minimum requirements for the simulator 
software to run are a computer system with optimum configuration (300Mz Processor 
with 128MB RAM) that is running on W indows, UNIX or Linux, Java Runtime 
Environment installed in the computer preferably with J2SDE 1.4.2.
The simulator software is opened by double-clicking the executable file, that 
contains the generated class files of the source code.
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4. 1 Simulator’s M ain Window
The following figure shows the main application frame that opens up, as soon as 
the simulator software is opened:
W lU  m Slmulatar
W"'""    aoxMii» E»ii
Close All 
ExH
Figure 16 Simulator Software’s main window
The Simulator Application looks like any other window application with similar 
look-and-feel and is easy to navigate. It has a M enu bar that has got Window, Mode, 
Simulation, Results and Exit menu options.
W indow menu has four menu items, namely. Simulator which opens up the 
simulation run window. Close which closes the active window. Close All which closes all 
the open windows and Exit which terminates the simulator application.
The Mode menu again has four menu items, out which only one can be chosen, 
that decides the mode in which the user wants the simulator to run. Real-time mode
38
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
makes the simulator run like in a real-time situation, Process mode pauses the simulation 
run after every process in the simulation and waits till the user wants to continue. Delay 
mode runs the simulation with a delay between every two processes in the run and 
Compare mode runs the simulator with the same set of simulation data but using all three 
different encryption methods and draws a comparison.
The Simulation menu has two simulation menu items. Run which opens up the 
simulator automatically and starts the simulation process according to the current system 
configuration that is chosen and Options which opens an options window, which helps 
the user to configure the RFID system and set its parameters.
The Results Menu again has two menu items. View Results opens the View 
Results window and Export Results exports the simulation run information to a custom 
text editor where it can be viewed, saved or printed. The Exit menu terminated the 
simulator application.
The following figure shows the hierarchical menu structure of the simulator 
software:
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S  i  j m  1 a _ t  o  i~
O l o s ^
All
K esui-tim o
O e la y  
O  o  m  p  a j r e
■ O  t  i  o  r i  s
V i&vi7 R  ̂  8 T_i 11 s 
EZ.'scF̂ or't R é s u l t é
Figure 17 Hierarchical M enu structure
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4.2 Simulator Window
The following figure shows the simulator window when it is opened, to run the 
simulation.
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Tag 10
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Cncrypled Tag ID (MSU Key, LSD-Random Code)
Encrypted Tag ID (MSD Random Code, LSD-Key)
Encryirted Aiilh. Code
D e c re e d  Tag ID (MSB Kr^. LSB-Ramlom Code)
Deciyirtori Tag If) (MSB-Random Code, LSH-Key)
; Decrypted Autli. Code
a
Figure 18 Simulator Window
The simulator window has a text area where the details of the simulation run are 
updated, even as the simulation is running. It also has fields that display the Tag’s data, 
after the encryption process and also after decryption. The simulation is started by 
clicking on the Run button at the bottom. The Options and View Results button open the
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respective windows and Close button closes this window. The Next button is used in 
Process mode.
4.3 Options Window
The system configuration can be set using the options window, before running the 
simulation. Clicking the Options button opens the Options window.
Sinuta lioa  P fogress  ^form alion
Status Box
P f/D  Ta§ Ùata
TagB
Key
W Options
Encryption Type 
#'Ôoobànp«M|i 
OTEA 
OAES
Fretiuency Range 
•  Low Frequency 
High Frequency 
URra-Hloh Frequency 
( j  Microwave
Moile
®  ReaFTlme 
C Ptocew 
Dohy
C ’ Compare 
Frequency Moilt 
I #  Unrnmlulateo 
Moilulateil
Save Cancel
EncrypteU Tag ID (MSB-Key, LSB Random Code) 
Enciyiited Tag ID (MSB Random Code, LSB-Key) 
Encrypted Auth. Code
Df>crypM  R W  Taÿ Data
Deciypted Tag ID (MSB-Key, LSB Random Code) 
Decrypted Tag ID (MSB-Random Code, LSB-K^) 
Decrvtited Airth. Code
Close
Figure 19 Options window of the Simulator
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The following figure shows the simulator window, after a simulation run, with the 
default configuration (Boolean Encryption Type; Real-time mode; Low frequency range; 
Unmodulated frequency):
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Figure 20 Simulator window after a simulation run
W hen running in the process mode, the simulator window freezes letting the user 
hit only the next button. The user may choose to stop to view the simulation process after 
every single step and the simulation does not proceed until the user clicks on the Next
42
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
button. This mode is for a better understanding of the protocol. The following figure 
shows the simulator window running in Process mode:
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Figure 21 Simulator window when running in Process mode
Once the simulation run is completed, the View Results button can be clicked to 
view the results of the simulation. It opens a View Results window which gives the 
options of exporting the simulation data and to view the encryption time details as a pie 
chart. When the Export Results option is chosen, the simulation data are exported to a
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custom text editor, where the data can be manipulated, saved as a text file or printed. If 
the Chart option is chosen, the time needed for encryption/ decryption at various stages of 
the simulation run are displayed, as a Pie Chart, in nanoseconds.
4.4 View Results Window
The following figures show the View Result window, the exported results and the 
pie chart with the results of the simulation run;
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Figure 22 View Results window of the Simulator
44
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
g
na^
Operation Bits sel to 10 by RFID Tag
^ R f l D  Shnulalor J* V *«N olep« l
file Edit SfiBW fBmial
M :(e , a  .................
New 64 Bit Key sent to Reader by Backend Application
New 64 Bit Key transm itted to RFID Tag by Reader
890.0 MHz
Air Interface Communication Parameters based on IS 0 13000-6 Part 6/ISO 18000-7 Part 7 
<data rate»
New 64 Bit Key received by RFID Tag
Operation Bits checked ty th e  Tag
RFID Tag's 64 Bit Key oyer-written with the new 64 Bit Key received 
Operation Bits set to TO by RFID Tag
Dummy Data transmitted, to Reader
744.0 MHz
Air Interface Com m unication Parameters based on ISO 18000-6 Part 5/ISO 18000-7 Part 7 
<data rate»
Dummy Data received by Reader
Dummy Data sent to Backend Application by the Reader
Backend Application verified Operation Bits
Backend Application acknowledged comp.ietion o fR ead  operation
End of Simulation!
M
          .
D ecn ip w  Teg B  #SB4Tandom Codo. 4881484182848776907 4603841948281410330
OeoyMed AuOi. Cade 8337076945832168385
•A F Next (
Figure 23 Simulation Results exported to a custom text editor
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Figure 24 Pie-chart of time needed for encryption/decryption in simulation run
This Simulator is based only on the protocol proposed in this thesis and cannot be 
used for a general RFID system, although the code can be modified to make it a general 
RFID simulator.
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CHAPTER 5
SECURITY PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
RFID Applications are probably the most pervasive technologies, but can be 
exposed to new threats on security and privacy. A typical RFID Application is a really 
simple system, in terms of the communication between its entities. W ireless exchange of 
data between low-power devices makes an RFID system, highly vulnerable to a wide 
range of attacks.
[39] discusses in detail, the different types of attacks that are possible on low cost 
Identification devices. The basic possible attacks on an RFID system are listed below
[40]:
Eavesdropping 
Man-in-the-middle 
Replay attack
Data Loss (DoS, M essage hijacking)
Forgery (Decoy Tag, etc.)
Physical attack
The restrictions on the resources of an RFID system, rule out the possibility of a 
complex and fool-proof security protocol. The security implementation is always a trade­
off between how secure the application is required to be, and an efficient light-weight 
security protocol. The eventual choice depends on the consequences of a compromised
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system and on how much data loss is acceptable. A simple protocol that secures the 
application, from the above-mentioned attacks, in the most efficient way possible, with 
minimal utilization of resources, is the call of the day.
5.1 Security Analysis against Attacks
The security protocol that is proposed here, tries to resist any attack effectively, as 
discussed below:
5.1.1 Eavesdropping
An Eavesdropping attack, as the name suggests, is tapping data that is transmitted 
between two legitimate objects, without their knowledge and without any modification to 
the data [41]. In case of an RFID system, it refers to an adversary, intercepting the data 
that is being transmitted between either the Tag and the Reader or the Reader and the 
backend application, without altering it. The data transmission between the Reader and 
the backend application is quite generic and can use any protocol, like TCP/IP, SOAP, 
SSL/TLS, etc. or can use a M iddleware that controls the data transmission using one or 
more of these protocols, implemented with a high level of security, according to the 
application in question [42]. Since, there is a lot of research already being done, on the 
security aspects of data transmission between the Reader and the backend application, 
and since the security protocol proposed in this dissertation deals with the authentication 
of the RFID Tag and the Reader, it is not imperative, to study the middleware security 
aspects. The attack on the communication between the Reader and the Tag is of more 
relevance, here.
The fact that the Tag and the Reader communicate using RF waves, in a wireless 
medium, makes Eavesdropping an imminent possibility. A single antenna that is within
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the range of the RFID system, is sufficient to receive the RF signals that are being 
transmitted, and decoded later [43]. It is practically impossible to stop any other RF 
receiver from receiving the RF signals and hence the proposed protocol tries to overcome 
this by transmitting dummy data, along with the original data so that even if the attacker, 
or Eavesdropper, intercepts the data, it would not make much sense to him.
The transmission protocol uses Frequency Division Multiplexing, along with 
Frequency Hopping. The frequency range that the RFID devices operate in is divided into 
bands and data is transmitted through all the bands synchronously. Frequency Division 
Multiplexing is the traditional access method for Radio signal transmission. The RFID 
device transmits the required data through one of the frequency bands and dummy data 
through the rest of the bands. The security implementation of the RF application is such 
that, the frequency at which the legitimate data is sent, keeps changing for every 
transmission. This type of access. Frequency Hopping -  Code Division M ultiple Access 
(FH-CDMA), is used to minimize the effectiveness of unauthorized interception or 
jamming of communication [29]. This type of access method does not eliminate 
Eavesdropping but reduces the possibility of the attack by more than 90%. Thus, even if 
the transmitted data was intercepted, the eavesdropper would not know if it is the original 
data and with the frequency hops changing with a Spread function [29], it can be harder 
to validate any data that might be even intercepted.
5.1.2 Man-In-The-Middle
A M an-In-The-M iddle attack (MITM) is an attack in which an attacker is able to 
read, insert and modify at will, messages between two parties without either party 
knowing that the link between them has been compromised [44]. This type of attack.
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against an RFID system would mean an attacker being able to intercept and modify data 
that is being exchanged between either the Reader and the Tag or the Reader and the 
Backend application. Again, we choose to ignore the security aspects of communication 
between the Reader and the Backend application.
An MITM  attack on the communication between the Tag and the Reader is 
probably the most adverse attack and is capable of having the whole system 
compromised. Eavesdropping, discussed above, is a special case of the M ITM  attack in 
which the data is intercepted but not modified.
Assuming the attacker intercepts the legitimate data, the security implementation 
should make sure the data is encrypted so as to make it as obscure as possible. Encrypting 
the data before transmitting it reduces the loss by a big margin, but however, as discussed 
earlier, the type of encryption is always a trade-off and depends on the type of encryption 
the RF application can afford. The proposed security protocol recommends the use of an 
encryption algorithm that uses a key, which is changed after every successful read- 
response between the Tag and the Reader. It should be noted that, encryption and 
decryption are practically impossible when using passive RFID Tags, tags which don’t 
have a power source of their own.
The proposed protocol secures the physical layer of communication by using 
Frequency Hopping. W ith frequency hopping, only the valid tag and the reader know 
which frequency is being used for legitimate communication, with the rest carrying 
useless data. For a Man-in-the-middle, figuring the frequency hop sequence is impossible 
as it is randomly generated, and hence even though intercepting data is possible in an 
RFID system, the M an-in-the-middle attack is proven to be not so effective.
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5.1.3 Replay Attack
A replay attack is a form of network attack in which a valid data transmission is 
maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. This is carried out either by the 
originator or by an adversary who intercepts the data and retransmits it, possibly as part 
o f a masquerade attack by IP packet substitution (such as stream cipher attack) [45]. The 
various methods of preventing replay attacks are discussed in [46, 47, 49], which include 
session timeouts, timestamping, statistical analysis, etc.
A Replay attack on an RFID system would mean an attacker intercepting data that 
is transmitted between the tag and the reader, and repeating or delaying it. In a replay 
attack, an adversary broadcasts an exact replay of the transponder end of the radio signal 
recorded from a past transaction between an RF device and a reader. W here mechanisms 
exist to foil simple replays (such as time stamps, one-time passwords, and challenge- 
response cryptography) a related but more sophisticated attack can frequently still 
succeed. This attack, commonly known as the relay attack, uses a man in the middle 
adversary to relay an ephemeral connection from a legitimate reader through one or more 
adversarial devices to a legitimate tag which may be at a considerable distance. The 
distance at which the relay attack can succeed is limited only by the latency which will be 
tolerated by the attacked protocol [49]. According to [50], a simple security protocol 
based on Semi-Randomized Access Control (SRAC) is efficient enough in securing a 
low-cost RFID system from  replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
The proposed protocol does not define any measures to tackle a replay attack in 
particular, but its current implementation is impregnable against it and also relay attacks. 
The security protocol conceals the legitimate data by transmitting in more than one
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channel and even if the frequency hop sequence is cracked, the data is encrypted using 
keys that keep changing, which would make very little sense to the attacker. Since, this 
implementation averts a replay attack by itself, any specific prevention techniques like 
timestamps, session timeouts, etc. will just be an overhead on an RFID system. If needed, 
stronger measures to prevent replay attacks could be implemented at the cost of a more 
complex system.
5.1.4 Data Loss/Denial of Service
A denial-of-service attack (DoS attack) is an attempt to make a computer resource 
unavailable to its intended users. A DoS attack can either force the victim to reset or 
consume its resources such that it can no longer provide its intended service or obstruct 
the communication media between the intended users and the victim so that they can no 
longer communicate adequately [51].
Denial-of-service denies service to valid users. Denial-of-service attacks are easy 
to accomplish and difficult to guard against. W e are unaware of any protocol-level 
technique for circumventing the effects of a malicious blocker tag, but explore simple 
ways of detecting the presence of such a device. An attacker kills tags in the supply 
chain, warehouse, or store disrupting business operations and causing a loss of revenue. 
Some tags have a “kill” command to destroy it to protect consumer privacy. If 
implemented in the tag, an attacker can “kill” the tag if the password is known. An 
attacker can also simulate many RFID tags simultaneously causing the anti-collision to 
perform singulation on a large number of tags making the system unavailable to 
authorized use. An attacker can also use a powerful jam m er that jam s the reader by 
creating a more powerful return signal than the signal returned from the tags and thus
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making the system unavailable to authorized users or could use a Faraday’s Cage [52, 
53].
The proposed protocol does not implement a “kill” command but keeps changing 
the public key used for encryption after every read-response cycle. However, it does not 
protect the system against Denial of Service by signal jamming. The system can be scaled 
to incorporate specific security against these sorts of attacks. If the data is made 
unavailable or if  it’s delayed, the proposed protocol has a timeout function, which is 
going to timeout the operation and the whole data exchange is dropped. The reader is 
going to send a new request at a different frequency which might not be jammed. If the 
whole frequency range is jam m ed or if  there is any physical factor that causes the loss of 
data, the protocol does not provide any means of security and has to be troubleshooted 
manually.
5.1.5 Forgery
Forgery refers to an adversary duplicating a valid tag or a reader to fake a 
legitimate transaction and steal data. The proposed protocol never lets an intruder get the 
details of a tag from the reader or from the tag. But if it’s compromised, the possibility of 
spoofing the tag is quite imminent. For the attacker to even duplicate, he needs to gather 
information about the system, like the frequency range, frequency hop sequence, or the 
tag ID, Authentication Code, etc.
5.1.6 Physical Attacks
Physical attacks are pretty straightforward and could be anything that could make 
the tag or the reader dysfunctional. The security protocol does not handle physical 
attacks. The RFID system needs to be physically secured from the proximity of any other
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electromagnetic field or an attacker who has easy access to the hardware of the RFID 
system setup.
The proposed protocol seems to work pretty fine against most of the attacks 
mentioned above. It is also proven to resist the STRIDE model of security threats for an 
RFID system. To test the protocol, a Simulator was coded in Java, and the simulation runs 
are used to corroborate the fact that this security protocol is pretty strong and rugged.
5.2 Encryption Implementation Analysis
The proposed Security protocol was tested with three different encryption 
methods. Boolean Encryption, Tiny Encryption Algorithm and Advanced Encryption 
Standard. Each of these encryption methods differ in the complexity of the algorithm, in 
terms of time and resources. Since the efficiency of these algorithms are already known, 
the question is about how well these algorithms would fit in an RFID system and enhance 
its performace. The memory resource utilized could not be computed when using a 
simulator but their performance was meansured in terms of time needed for encryption 
and decryption, when used in an RFID system. The following tables show the time 
needed for encryption and decryption, for each of these algorithms, over 10 runs, when 
run with the Simulator.
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5.2.1 Boolean (XOR) Encryption/ Decryption
Simulatio 
n Run
Auth 
Code 
Encrypti 
on Time
(nS)
Tag ID LSB- 
Random 
number 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
MSB-Key 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
LSB-Key 
Encrypti 
on Time 
(nS)
Tag ID MSB- 
Auth Code 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
Average 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
1 5 3 0 3 3 2.8
2 5 4 0 3 3 3.0
3 5 4 0 3 3 3.0
4 4 4 0 3 3 2.8
5 5 4 0 3 3 3.0
6 5 3 0 3 3 2.8
7 4 3 0 3 3 2.6
8 5 4 0 3 3 3.0
9 4 4 0 3 3 2.8
10 5 4 0 3 4 3.2
Table 2 Boolean XOR Encryption
The encryption time in nanoseconds for different encryptions in the protocol over 
10 simulation runs is tabulated as shown above. The average encryption time over 10 
runs is 2.9 nanoseconds.
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Simulatio 
n Run
Auth Code 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
LSB- 
Random 
number 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
MSB-Key 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
LSB-Key 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
MSB-Auth 
Code 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Average 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
1 3 3 3 3 4 3.2
2 3 3 3 3 3 3.0
3 4 3 3 3 3 3.2
4 3 3 3 3 3 3.0
5 4 3 4 3 3 3.4
6 3 3 3 3 3 3.0
7 3 3 3 3 3 3.0
8 4 3 4 3 3 3.4
9 4 3 3 3 3 3.2
10 4 3 3 3 3 3.2
Table 3 Boolean XOR Decryption
The decryption time in nanoseconds for different decryptions in the protocol over 
10 simulation runs is tabulated as shown above. The average decryption time over 10 
runs is 3.16 nanoseconds.
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5.2.2 TEA Encryption/ Decryption
Simulatio 
n Run
Auth 
Code 
Encrypti 
on Time 
(nS)
Tag ID 
LSB- 
Random 
number 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
MSB-Key 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
LSB-Key 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID MSB- 
Auth Code 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
Average 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
1 1193 1152 1096 1201 1155 1159.4
2 1205 1183 1175 1192 1176 1186.2
3 1187 1164 1188 1186 1159 1176.8
4 1196 1158 1179 1164 1168 1173
5 1163 1181 1143 1159 1177 1164.6
6 1145 1201 1152 1160 1153 1162.2
7 1142 1175 1144 1161 1164 1157.2
8 1211 1167 1169 1173 1163 1176.6
9 1189 1159 1163 1145 1172 1165.6
10 1181 1163 1181 1179 1187 1178.2
Table 4 Tiny Encryption Algorithm Encryption
The encryption time in nanoseconds for different encryptions in the protocol over 
10 simulation runs is tabulated as shown above. The average encryption time over 10 
runs is 1169.98 nanoseconds.
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Simulatio 
n Run
Auth Code 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
LSB- 
Random 
number 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
MSB-Key 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
LSB-Key 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
MSB-Auth 
Code 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Average 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
1 1184 1148 1138 1144 1147 1152.2
2 1198 1179 1174 1177 1181 1181.8
3 1173 1231 1178 1195 1195 1194.4
4 1207 1152 1155 1167 1153 1166.8
5 1154 1175 1184 1163 1202 1175.6
6 1133 1172 1192 1181 1177 1171
7 1124 1176 1190 1182 1213 1177
8 1200 1200 1184 1175 1186 1189
9 1125 1185 1194 1131 1156 1158.2
10 1174 1175 1168 1164 1167 1169.6
Table 5 Tiny Encryption Algorithm Decryption
The decryption time in nanoseconds for different decryptions in the protocol over 
10 simulation runs is tabulated as shown above. The average decryption time over 10 
runs is 1173.56 nanoseconds.
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5.2.3 AES Encryption/ Decryption
Simulati 
on Run
Auth Code 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
LSB- 
Random 
number 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
MSB-Key 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
LSB-Key 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
MSB-Auth 
Code 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
Average 
Encryption 
Time (nS)
1 3341 5153 3152 3054 3576 3655.2
2 4347 5651 4308 4209 2482 4199.4
3 4731 3497 3211 3199 3415 3610.6
4 3204 2948 2666 3225 4180 3244.6
5 5977 3016 2387 2374 2376 3226
6 4170 4246 3708 3587 3470 3836.2
7 2794 2559 2393 2656 3140 2708.4
8 4574 3108 4196 4963 3472 4062.6
9 3531 3884 3043 4341 2633 3486.4
10 3290 3073 3053 4146 3034 3319.2
Table 6 Advanced Encryption Standard Encryption
The encryption time in nanoseconds for different encryptions in the protocol over 
10 simulation runs is tabulated as shown above. The average encryption time over 10 
runs is 3534.86 nanoseconds.
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Simulati 
on Run
Auth Code 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
LSB- 
Random 
number 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
MSB-Key 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
LSB-Key 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Tag ID 
MSB-Auth 
Code 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
Average 
Decryption 
Time (nS)
1 3054 2894 2934 4115 3154 3230.2
2 2817 2763 2739 4963 4009 3458.2
3 3229 3018 3090 4923 3066 3465.2
4 2762 2409 2414 3621 2429 2727
5 2433 2229 2318 2310 2244 2306.8
6 3257 3275 . 2852 3571 3162 3223.4
7 2267 2134 2223 2129 2694 2289.4
8 3085 2987 3016 2981 3627 3139.2
9 3297 2970 2912 4205 4069 3490.6
10 4103 3053 2946 3034 2942 3215.6
Table 7 Advanced Encryption Standard Decryption
The decryption time in nanoseconds for different decryptions in the protocol over 
10 simulation runs is tabulated as shown above. The average decryption time over 10 
runs is 3054.56 nanoseconds.
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The following diagram shows the graph of both the average encryption time and 
the average decryption time, for the three encryption types, over 10 simulation runs:
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Figure 25 Simulation Run plotted against the Average Encryption Time for the 3
encryption types
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Figure 26 Simulation Run plotted against the Average Decryption Time for the 3
encryption types
61
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE W ORK 
In the course of this thesis, it was observed that the proposed security protocol can 
secure an RFID system from the m ost sophisticated attacks. It can be implemented in any 
active RFID system but has to be modified in order to be implemented in an RFID system 
with passive tags. Tiny Encryption Algorithms seems to suit the RFID application better 
than any other encryption algorithm, as mentioned in [17]. Overall, the proposed protocol 
scores over the existing ones with a simple authentication procedure and a robust 
encryption and secure medium access, implemented in a typical RFID system.
W ith the rapid growth of RFID each day, the proposed protocol will find 
extensive use in future because with wider deployment of more complex applications, the 
effective cost of this protocol which might seem a little expensive for a light-weight 
RFID system, will go down. This protocol can also be tested with different types of 
encryption to protect data and ensure privacy. The type of encryption is a trade-off and 
can be chosen according to the application that uses RFID. Hence, this protocol can be 
substituted with any other encryption that is feasible for RFID operation and can also be 
modified to save power and memory resources, though at the cost of some security 
compromised.
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